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Abstract
Horkheimer and Adorno in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, and Neumann in Behemoth, 
have tried to understand the genealogy, 
the structures and the practices of fascism 
in particular through Hobbes’ philosophy. 
However, despite their common mem-
bership in the Institut für Sozialforschung, 
they disagreed on the continuity between 
Hobbes’ absolutism and European fascism. 
Horkheimer and Adorno were convinced 
that Hobbes’ absolutism and fascism have 
shared the same anthropological origins, the 
principle of “Self-preservation” being at the 
root of absolutism as well as fascism. In both 
cases, the power is benefiting the dominant 
class, and creates an expanse where individ-
uals destroy themselves. However, accord-
ing to Neumann, absolutism and fascism 
are opposed, because Hobbes’ “Leviathan” 
is a real state and differs from nazi « Behe-
moth », which is a non-state. The human 
reason that grounds the civil state is not just 
“instrumental”, but also emancipatory.
Keywords: Horkheimer, Adorno, Neu-
mann, Hobbes, Fascism, Totalitarianism, 
Absolutism Self-preservation, Aufklärung, 
Reason..
Resumen
Horkheimer y Adorno en Dialéctica de la 
ilustración, y Neumann en Behemoth, han 
tratado de comprender la genealogía, las es-
tructuras y las prácticas del fascismo en par-
ticular a través de la filosofía de Hobbes. Sin 
embargo, a pesar de su membresía común 
en el Institut für Sozialforschung, no estaban 
de acuerdo sobre la continuidad entre el ab-
solutismo de Hobbes y el fascismo europeo. 
Horkheimer y Adorno estaban convencidos 
de que el absolutismo y el fascismo de Ho-
bbes compartían los mismos orígenes antro-
pológicos, y que el principio de «autocon-
servación» estaba en la raíz del absolutismo 
y del fascismo. En ambos casos, el poder 
beneficia a la clase dominante y crea una ex-
pansión donde los individuos se destruyen a 
sí mismos. Sin embargo, según Neumann, 
el absolutismo y el fascismo se oponen, por-
que el «Leviatán» de Hobbes es un estado 
real y difiere de la nazi «Behemoth», que no 
es un estado. La razón humana que funda-
menta el estado civil no es solo «instrumen-
tal», sino también emancipadora..
Palabras Clave: Horkheimer, Adorno, 
Neumann, Hobbes, Fascismo, Totalitarismo, 
Absolutismo, Auto-conservación, Aufklärung, 
Racionalidad..
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In the Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt gives a special status to Hob-bes in the history of political philosophy. According to her, we can find in Hobbesian thought some prefiguration of totalitarianism. In her analysis of 
“imperialism”, she writes that it is not a coincidence that Hobbesian absolutism 
and totalitarianism are identified 1. For Arendt, Hobbes is at first a bourgeois phi-
losopher, because he advocates the extension and the expansion of power on the 
citizens and outside the state in order to support the “accumulation of capital”. 
The process of the accumulation of power is “never-ending” and goes beyond the 
borders as well as the financial capital; which is why he “foreshadowed the rise of 
imperialism” 2. However, he would have also prefigured totalitarianism. Arendt 
asserts indeed “Hobbes provided political thought with the prerequisite for all 
race doctrines, that is, the exclusion in principle of the idea of humanity which 
constitutes the sole regulating idea of international law” 3. According to Arendt, 
Hobbes would have justified the idea of “race” and of wars, which can be found 
in totalitarian doctrines 4. 
After WWII, Hannah Arendt continues the work of Horkheimer and Ador-
no’s approach by searching for the meaning of the barbarism perpetuated by 
totalitarian movements throughout the history of philosophy 5. All of them are 
convinced that there is a continuity between Hobbes and totalitarianism or 
fascism 6. Both terms are synonyms in that they designate states where people 
1  Arendt Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Part Two “Imperialism”, Chapter 5 “The political emancipation 
of bourgeoisie”, Orlando, Harvest book - Harcourt Brace and co, 1979, p. 139.
2  Ibid, p. 143.
3  Ibid, p. 157.
4  Arendt pointed out that the Hobbesian idea of “the state of nature” between the states themselves is “the best 
possible theoretical foundation for those naturalistic ideologies which hold nations to be tribes, separated from 
each other by nature, […], unconscious of the solidarity of mankind and having in common only the instinct 
of self-preservation which man shares with the animal world.” Cf. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, op. 
cit., p. 157.
5  Cf. Horkheimer Max, “Idee, Aktivität und Programm des Instituts für Sozialforschung [1938]”, in M. Horkhei-
mer, Gesammelte Schriften XII, Frankfurt a. M. Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1987, p. 149: „Der autoritäre Staat 
ist auch in der bürgerlichen Epoche nichts Neues, sondern die durch den Liberalismus vermittelte Rückkehr zu 
autoritären Formen, die im Absolutismus ihre Vorgeschichte haben.“
6  Hannah Arendt uses more the term of “Totalitarianism” than “Fascism” because; totalitarianism refers only to 
National Socialism and Stalinism. By contrast, Mussolini’s fascist regime is a tyranny or a dictatorship. His au-
thority relies on a party, and not on a movement. Besides, in Dialectic of Enlightenment, Totalitarianism is more 
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are dominated by terror and ideology. They refer mostly to National Socialism, 
Italian Fascism and Stalinism. According to Arendt, totalitarian regimes aim 
to abolish spontaneity in human beings, which is the most basic expression of 
liberty 7. This differs from authoritarian regime or tyranny, because it is not a 
restriction of human liberty, but its elimination. In Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
common thought, fascism is also the framework of the “decline of the individ-
ual” 8. Moreover, it contains Horkheimer’s notion of an “Authoritarian State”, 
which takes up the notion of “State Capitalism” theorized by Friedrich Pollock, 
an economist and the associate director in the Institute for Social Research. 
“Authoritarian State” is defined like the result of the centralisation of economic 
and political power in the hands of a powerful minority; it appears after the 
monopolistic phase of capitalism 9.
Thus, I am going to use the word “fascism” in the large sense of the term, that 
is, in the sense that has been developed in Dialectic of Enlightenment. Fascism is 
not only Mussolini’s doctrine, it also takes the form of National-Socialism. Ac-
cording to Horkheimer and Adorno, fascism has at least two characteristics, both 
a political and anthropological dimension: first, it is the political domination 
of the most powerful over the mob. Secondly, it is the revenge of the impulses 
against the civilizing reason.
It is true that Hobbes’ state is also based on coercive power and ideology 10. 
Nevertheless, the political aims of Hobbesian absolutism and fascism are com-
pletely different. For Hobbes, the purpose of state is to ensure the “safety of the 
people”. According to him, “safety” is not “a bare preservation, but also all other 
contentments of life which every man […] shall acquire to himself ” 11. On the 
contrary, according to the German philosophers, humans lose their subjectivity 
an adjective than a substantive. To go into this question in depth, cf. Katia Genel, «La dialectique de la raison, 
contribution à une théorie du totalitarisme ? – Etat autoritaire, Etat totalitaire et non-Etat», in La dialectique 
de la raison – Sous bénéfice d’inventaire supervised by Katia Genel, Paris, Editions de la Maison des sciences de 
l’homme, 2017, pp. 117-135.
7  Cf. Arendt H., The Origins of Totalitarianism, op. cit., p. 438: “The camps are meant not only to exterminate 
people and degrade human beings, but also server the ghastly experiment of eliminating, under scientifically 
controlled conditions, spontaneity itself as an expression of human behaviour, and of transforming the human 
personality into mere thing, into something that even animals are not […].”
8  Cf. Horkheimer Max, Eclipse of reason, New York, Bloomsbury Academic, 2013, the title of the 4th chapter: “Rise 
and Decline of the Individual”.
9  Cf. Horkheimer M., “Autoritär Staat”, Gesammelte Schriften V, Frankfurt a. M., Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 
1987, pp. 293-319. Pollock Friedrich, “State Capitalism: its Possibilities and Limits” and “Is National Socialism 
a New Order?”, Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, Jahrgang 9, 1941, München, Deutschen Taschenbuch Verlag, 
1980, respectively pp. 200-225 and pp. 440-445. 
10  The term “ideology” in Hobbes’ philosophy refers to the “public instruction” about laws and citizens’ duties.
11  Hobbes Thomas, Leviathan, Chapter XXX, Oxford, edited by Gaskin in Oxford University press, 2008, p. 222.
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and their individuality under fascist domination. Franz L. Neumann, another 
member of the IfS, argues that absolutism and fascism have not the same polit-
ical structures and practices. For him, Hobbes’ Leviathan is a real state, because 
it preserves the rule of the law and the citizens’ rights. By contrast, Neumann’s 
Behemoth, who has taken Hobbes’ title from Behemoth and the Long Parliament, 
is a non-state, the anarchy that has destroyed human rights and dignity.
Thus, if there is indeed a crucial difference between Hobbes’ state and fascist 
movement; is it relevant to establish a continuity between Hobbesian theory 
and fascism? Since it is difficult to identify absolutism with fascism when we 
consider legal and political structures, how can Horkheimer and Adorno assert 
as such?
My hypothesis is that the authors of the Dialectic of Enlightenment draw a 
correlation between Hobbes and fascism from an anthropological perspective. 
Hobbes is described as a “somber writer of the early bourgeois period”, who “rec-
ognized society as the destructive principle” 12. By “speaking up the egoism of the 
self ” 13 through the principle of “self-preservation”, he perceived that one of the 
consequences of economic liberalism can be self-destruction. This perspective is 
anthropological because it assesses how the will of self-preservation finally leads 
a fascist minority to use absolutist techniques of power against the masses. In 
addition, self-preservation is also “a destructive natural force” 14 insofar as human 
beings must adapt themselves to the reality and lose their individuality in the 
fascist era. Thus, Horkheimer and Adorno establish the link between Hobbes and 
fascism by analysing the transformation of human beings.
The question is, how relevant is the link between Hobbes and fascism, correla-
tion that is anthropological here? 
First, I will study the use of Hobbes in Dialectic of Enlightenment and analyse the 
notions of “self-preservation” and “reason”. If the Hobbesian concept of “reason” 
involves only “instrumental reason”, it is relevant to return to Hobbes in the history 
of the “bourgeois rationality” in order to understand the roots of fascism.
Secondly, I will study another conception of the Hobbesian anthropology in 
Neumann’s Behemoth, where the concept of “reason” is universal and objective, 
and consequently differs from “instrumental reason”. Contrary to Horkheimer and 
Adorno, he connects the anthropological issues with political theory.
12  Horkheimer Max and Adorno Theodor, Dialectic of Enlightenment, E. Jephcott trans., Standford University 




1.  Self-preservation and domination: Hobbes as agent of the “conspiracy of rulers 
against peoples” 15.
In the Dialectic of enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno conceive that the 
Aufklärung as “thought in progress”, can, in some historical circumstances, lead 
to fascism, after the liberal phase. The fact that the instrumental reason finds the 
better means for any ends produces a world where the values of humanity are liq-
uidated, and where nature and men can finally be dominated. The sole principle of 
the instrumental reason is the self-preservation.
Precisely, the authors perceive a link between Hobbes and fascism through the 
anthropological concept of “self-preservation”. On the one hand, they explain how 
Hobbes’ political theory serves the interests and the self-preservation of the pow-
erful minority in the fascist regime. On the other hand, they see in the Hobbesian 
transition from the “natural condition” to the civil condition how individuals final-
ly destruct themselves by desiring to preserve themselves. 
It is remarkable that the notion of “self-preservation” is fundamental in Levia-
than as much as in Dialectic of Enlightenment. For Hobbes, it represents the funda-
mental right of nature, that is, “the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, 
as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature” 16. The right of nature 
contains all men’s action, which are necessary for their own preservation. In a civil 
state, this law of nature limits men. Law of nature is a precept “found out by reason, 
by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh 
away the means of preserving the same” 17 . The laws of nature are just precepts of 
reason; they become laws only due to the sovereign’s coercive power. They contain 
the rules by which men can live in peace, because peace is the sole state where they 
can preserve their life and felicity. Therefore, self-preservation is the principle of 
some men’s action, and the purpose of laws of nature that forbid self-destruction. 
For Horkheimer and Adorno, self-preservation do not have the exact same 
meaning: it is concomitant with the formation of the Ego and individuality. In-
deed, the notion of Ego is not only biological, but also historical. It is the result of 
the separation between the self and nature. The subject can preserve the self and 
be separated from nature only by its domination. Consequently, self-preservation 
is the principle of the domination of nature, and thus it becomes the principle 
of science and exploitation of nature. The main instrument to dominate nature 
15  Horkheimer M. and Adorno T., Dialectic of Enlightenment, op. cit., p. 68.
16  Hobbes, Leviathan, XIV, op. cit., p. 86.
17  Idem.
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is Reason, in its instrumental potentiality. With reason, men can find the means 
for any ends. In short, self-preservation is not only preservation of his own life 
as Hobbes underlined it, but also a way of preserving the ego as principle of in-
dividuality.
So how are the principle of self-preservation and the instrumental reason artic-
ulated with fascism in Dialectic of Enlightenment? The authors highlight two view-
points: the viewpoint of those dominated and the dominant’s viewpoint. First, in 
a fascist state, dominated people have to be adapted to new sets of rules: “[…] the 
people were prepared to adapt themselves passively to new power relations, to allow 
themselves only the kind of reaction that enabled them to fir into the economic, 
social and political setup.” 18. Self-preservation demands that subjects adapt them-
selves to any kind of political setup. 
Secondly, self-preservation underlies the conduct of the dominants. According 
to Horkheimer and Adorno, the ego can “expand” or “contract with the individu-
al’s prospects of economic autonomy and productive ownership” 19. Therefore, if we 
follow the principle of self-preservation, dominants want to maintain and increase 
their domination over the masses. The domination of nature requires domination 
of other men because a minority of men wants to keep the power. Therefore, the 
principle of self-preservation is not limited at liberalism; it is also specific to fas-
cism. It triggers the search for ways to dominate people. 
Besides, according to Horkheimer and Adorno, Hobbes already dealt with the 
techniques of people’s domination.
“Finally it passes from the expropriated citizens to the totalitarian trust-masters, whose 
science has become the quintessence of the methods by which the subjugated mass society 
reproduces itself. […] The conspiracy of rulers against peoples, implemented by relentless 
organization, finds the Enlightenment spirit since Machiavelli and Hobbes no less compliant 
than the bourgeois republic.” 20. 
In other words, the techniques to dominate other men are a thematic of political 
philosophy during the early bourgeois period, that is, for Machiavelli and Hobbes. 
Therefore, the authors establish a first link between Hobbes and fascism because 
Hobbes sets the means to dominate the masses. In “Die Juden und Europa” and 
in his preface of the ninth issue of the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, Horkheimer 
brings the common techniques of power shared by absolutist and fascist rulers to 
18  Horkheimer M., Eclipse of Reason, op. cit., p. 70.
19  Horkheimer M. and Adorno T., Dialectic of Enlightenment, op. cit., p. 68.
20  Idem.
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light. These are “ideology” and “terror” 21. In “Die Juden und Europa”, terror has 
been always advised for the dominant class since Machiavelli 22. In Horkheimer’s 
preface, the fascist clique “shuffles [ideologies] about freely and cynically according 
to the changing situation, thus finally translating into open action what modern 
political theory from Machiavelli and Hobbes to Pareto has professed.” 23
Hobbes is a representative of the will to dominate nature and men in the history 
of Enlightenment, and is connected with fascism because he belongs to Enlighten-
ment as “fortschreitenden Denken” which finally leads to fascism as a way of assert-
ing a very strong power over the masses. 
Yet, I state that Hobbes’ Leviathan is not at all a foreshadowing of totalitarian 
states. In the Leviathan, the sovereign has an absolute power and is not subjected 
to the law because laws are the expression of his will. However, the purpose of 
the generation and the existence of the state is not limited to the domination for 
the domination, or the happiness just for the most powerful men only, but in-
volves the “salus populi,”, in other words, the “safety” of people. Furthermore, the 
creation of the Commonwealth by the social pact is not based on the future sov-
ereign’s will to dominate and preserve himself, because its purpose is the self-pres-
ervation of each man in the multitude. My hypothesis is that Horkheimer and 
Adorno did not intend to say that the structures of totalitarian state are already 
in the Leviathan. Instead that they perceived in Hobbes’ work a manifestation of 
the will of domination specific to the Enlightenment spirit and later peculiar to 
fascism. 
2.  From Self-Preservation to Self-Destruction: What is “Coming Out” of the 
Hobbesian Natural Condition in Dialectic of Enlightenment?
In Dialectic of enlightenment, the connection between Hobbes and fascism is 
not to be found directly in his political theory, but in his anthropology, through 
the transition from the “natural condition” to the civil condition. In Hobbes’ 
anthropology and political theory, the civil condition is the result of the insti-
tution of the Commonwealth. There is no differences between living in the civil 
21  In the 1950s, Hannah Arendt also refers to ideology and terror as the specific instruments of domination in 
totalitarian states. Cf. The Origins of Totalitarianism, op. cit., Part Three “Totalitarianism”, chapter 13 “Ideology 
and Terror: a Novel Form of Government”, pp. 460-479. 
22  Horkheimer M., „Die Juden und Europa“, Gesammelte Schriften IV, Frankfurt a. M., Fischer Taschenbuchver-
lag, 1988, p. 316-317.
23  Horkheimer M. “Preface” in ZfS, Jahrgang 9, 1941, op. cit., p. 196.
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condition and being ruled by the sovereign. The Hobbesian themes of the “nat-
ural condition” and “Commonwealth” implicitly appears in this quote from the 
second digression:
“If all affects are of equal value, then self-preservation, which dominates the form of the 
system in any case, seems to offer the most plausible maxim for action. It was to be given free 
rein in the free economy. The somber writers of the early bourgeois period, such as Machiavelli, 
Hobbes, and Mandeville, who spoke up for the egoism of the self, thereby recognized society as 
the destructive principle and denounced harmony before it was elevated to the official doctrine 
by the bearers of light, the classicists. The former writers exposed the totality of the bourgeois 
order as the horrifying entity, which finally engulfed both, the general and the particular, socie-
ty and the self.  With the development of the economic system in which the control of the eco-
nomic apparatus by private groups creates a division between human beings, self-preservation, 
although treated by reason as identical, had become the reified drive of each individual citizen 
and proved to be a destructive natural force no longer distinguishable from self-destruction.” 24
The authors established an opposition between the “somber writers” of the bour-
geoisie and the “classicists” such as Adam Smith, Jean-Baptiste Say and David Ricar-
do 25. Contrary to the classicist economists, the former writers Hobbes, Machiavelli 
and Mandeville have understood that in a society where free economy or liberalism 
rules, there is no harmony between the individuals and the society. For example, Adam 
Smith’s principle of the “invisible hand” demonstrates that when merchants and man-
ufacturers pursue their own interests, they contribute of the enrichment of the socie-
ty 26. Thus, the conflict of interests is solved in the social totality according the “bearers 
of light”. However, for Horkheimer and Adorno, such a harmony is an illusion. 
On the other hand, they praise Hobbes, Machiavelli and Mandeville for being 
more clear-sighted than the classicists are. From early on they have seen that the 
principle of self-preservation “proved to be a destructive natural force no longer dis-
tinguishable from self-destruction” 27. Then, they have understood that the pursuit 
24  Horkheimer M. and Adorno T., Dialectic of Enlightenment, op. cit., p. 71.
25  Cf. Horkheimer M., “Die gegenwärtige Lage der Sozialphilosophie und die Aufgaben eines Instituts für Sozial-
forschung [1931]“, Gesammelte Schriften III, Frankfurt a. M., Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988. In this speech, 
Horkheimer refers to Adam Smith, Jean-Baptiste Say and David Ricardo as the names of the liberal economists. 
He quotes them through their use in Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right, § 189.
26  Cf. Smith Adam, The Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Chapter II, Amsterdam, Lausanne, Melbourne, Milan, New 
York, Sao Paulo, Ϻέτα Libri Digital Edition, 2007, p. 349-350: “By preferring the support of domestic to that 
of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its 
produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led 
by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the 
society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more 
effectually than when he really intends to promote it.”
27  Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, op. cit., p. 71.
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of an individual’s own interest in order to preserve himself leads to self-destruction. 
Yet it is strange that Hobbes is, on the one hand, a spokesman of the “egoism of the 
self ” specific to the liberal era, and on the other hand, an apologist for the “horri-
fying entity which finally engulfed both, the general and the particular, society and 
the self ” 28, that is, a representation of the fascist era. Moreover, it is puzzling that 
the German philosophers perceived in Hobbesian philosophy the “murky fusion” 29 
between self-preservation and self-destruction. 
Indeed, I claim that the term “society” from the quote above corresponds to a 
mix of “natural condition” and “civil state”. It refers to the competition between the 
bourgeois owners; so, it is the version of the war of every man against every man in 
the economic society. I also suppose that “the totality of the bourgeois order” is the 
state, while the “Leviathan” is the Commonwealth in Hobbes’ theory. So, if soci-
ety is recognized by Hobbes as “the destructive principle” and if the “totality […] 
engulfed both […] society and the self ” according to Horkheimer and Adorno, 
Hobbes would recognize the civil condition and the state as the framework where 
individuals are destructed. This assertion is like a distortion of his philosophy. For 
Hobbes, to come out of the natural condition by instituting the Commonwealth 
is the only way to preserve life and to be happy. The natural condition is indeed 
a condition where “the life of man” is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” 30. 
Therefore, how to explain that Hobbes recognizes “society” or “civil state” as the 
“destructive principle”, and “totality” or “Leviathan” as the scene of self-destruc-
tion?
Horkheimer and Adorno read Hobbes through Freud’s essays about the notion 
of Culture, The Future of an Illusion and Civilization and its Discontents. In both 
works, Freud takes Hobbes’ theme of “natural condition” and transforms it. To “lay 
down” almost all the “natural right” 31 in order to come out of the natural condition 
in Hobbes’s political theory, corresponds to “a renunciation of instincts” in the 
Future of an Illusion:
“It seems rather that every civilization must be built up in coercion and renun-
ciation of instincts […].” 32
28  Idem. NB: in this English translation of Dialectic of Enlightenment, the dimension of the “apology” or “praise” 
is forgotten. Cf. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung, in Horkheimer M., Gesammelte Schriften 
V, Frankfurt a. M., Fischer Taschenbuchverlag, 1987, p. 113: „Jene [Machiavelli, Hobbes, Mandeville] priesen 
die Totalität der bürgerlichen Ordnung […].“
29  Idem: “The two principles combined in a murky fusion”.
30  Hobbes, Leviathan, chapter XIII, op. cit., p. 84.
31  Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan, chapter XIV, op. cit., p. 87-88.
32  Freud Sigmund, The Future of an Illusion, James Strachey trans., New York, W. W. Norton and Company. INC., 
1961, p. 7. 
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According to Freud, human beings renounce and sacrifice their impulses, in or-
der to live in society peacefully and defend themselves against the external nature. 
Now, in Dialectic of Enlightenment, the renouncement of the impulses is a sacrifice 
of an internal nature and the Self 33. In his essay “The End of Reason” and its Ger-
man translation “Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung”, Horkheimer shows that life in 
community requires two kinds of renouncement, that is, the renouncement of the 
use of reason and the renouncement of instincts.
“The enthusiasm of the counter-revolution and of the popular leaders not only joined in 
a common faith in the executioner but also in the conviction that reason may at any time 
justify renouncing thought, particularly of the poor. De Maistre, a belated absolutist, prea-
ches forswearing reason for reason’s sake. […]. / The individual has to do violence to himself 
and learn that the life of the whole is the necessary precondition of his own. Reason has to 
master rebellious feelings and instincts, the inhibition of which is supposed to make human 
cooperation possible.” 34
In the German translation “Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung”, Horkheimer adds 
the name of Hobbes next to the French counter-revolutionary De Maistre: 
“De Maistre, ein verspäteter Absolutist, predigt mit Hobbes die Abschwörung des eige-
nen Urteils für alle Zeit, aus Vernunft. […].“ 35
Consequently, if “the life of the whole is the necessary precondition” of their 
own life, human beings must forswear their own judgement and sacrifice their in-
stincts, because those can be antagonistic towards the whole.  Such a renunciation 
is the ground for the Self-destruction and individual’s decline, specific to fascism. 
In the fascist era, the whole, as the state, would engulf individuals. According to 
Horkheimer and Adorno, Hobbes’ Leviathan is a preview of this pathological rela-
tion between the whole and individuals. 
The Freudian mediation in Dialectic of Enlightenment is thus necessary to un-
derstand why -for Horkheimer and Adorno- Hobbes praised “the totality of the 
bourgeois order as the horrifying entity which finally engulfed both, the general 
and the particular, society and the self ” 36. In other words, they can establish a link 
between Hobbes and fascism because they understand the transition from the nat-
33  Cf. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, “Excursus I: Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment”, 
op. cit., pp. 67-103.
34  Horkheimer M., “The End of Reason”, ZfS, Jahrgang 9, 1941, op. cit., p. 369.
35  Horkheimer M., “Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung”, Gesammelte Schriften V, op. cit. p. 325.
36  Horkheimer M. and Adorno T., Dialectic of Enlightenment, op. cit., p. 71.
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ural condition to the civil state as the renunciation to the instincts in order to live 
in society. Now, this renunciation prepares the Self-destruction peculiar to fascist 
phase: by aiming for the Self-preservation, individuals will renounce their own 
nature. Therefore, they will adapt not merely to the political reality of fascism, but 
they will take revenge against civilisation through barbarism and the persecution of 
minorities such as the Jewish people, for example 37.
To sum up, we have to understand that, in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Hob-
bes, as somber writers of the Enlightenment, is not only a pre-fascist writer. He 
brought to light the dark side of the Aufklärung, with the rawness and the lucid-
ity of his thought. However, Horkheimer and Adorno missed the purpose of the 
Leviathan as the construction of a state where men can live in peace, despite and 
with human passions. With their interpretation of the Hobbesian transition from 
natural condition to civil society, they cannot conceive a state which can realize 
the salus populi, or which can deal with the human passions. Indeed, their own 
anthropological conception is disconnected with a real political thought. We know 
that it is absurd to conceive the political system without an anthropology, but can 
we have a conception of the human nature by disregarding the political practices?
Now we have to confront their use of the Hobbesian anthropology with Franz 
Neumann’s reception of Hobbes in order to have another conception of the anthro-
pology connected with the political theory.
3. The prism of Neumann: Behemoth versus Leviathan.
Neumann has published his Behemoth in 1942. Contrary to Horkheimer and 
Adorno, he distinguished clearly the Hobbesian absolutism and the National So-
cialism, which we can understand as a type of fascism. 
“National Socialism is anti-democratic, anti-liberal, and profoundly anti-rational. That 
is why it cannot utilize any preceding political thought. Not even Hobbes’s political theory 
applies to it. The national socialist state is no Leviathan. But Hobbes aside from his Levia-
than also wrote Behemoth or the Long Parliament […]. Behemoth, which depicted England 
during the Long Parliament, was intended as the representation of a non-state, a situation 
characterized by complete lawlessness.” 38
37  Cf. Horkheimer M., Eclipse of reason, the third chapter “The Revolt of Nature”, op. cit., pp. 65-89.
38  Neumann Franz, Behemoth – The Structure and Practice of National Socialism 1933-1944, Chicago, Ivan R. 
Dee, 2009, p. 459.
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According to Neumann, National Socialism differs from absolutism, because the 
Nazi state is a non-state, has no legal structure and is irrational. In that way, he is in 
opposition to Carl Schmitt, and his conception of Hobbes 39. National Socialism is 
irrational because of its lack of political theory, where the structures of the state, the 
laws and their rationality can be outlined. Neumann has understood that Hobbes 
is not a fascist writer ahead of his time, since he asserts that Hobbes’ philosophy 
is rational. Indeed, he underlines the fact that Leviathan is based on laws and the 
rationality of the citizens:
“The Leviathan, although it swallows society, does not swallow all of it. Its sovereign 
power is founded upon the consent of man. Its justification is still rational and, in conse-
quence, incompatible with a political system that completely sacrifices the individual.” 40
In other words, Hobbesian state is rational because the sovereign power can be 
justified and accepted by the citizens, not only because of the coercive power, but 
also by his rationality expressed by the laws of nature. Furthermore, to live in the 
Commonwealth does not require a sacrifice of individuals because Hobbes postu-
lates the right of resistance 41. Indeed, the social pact cannot be valid if individuals 
commit to allowing killing, even by the sovereign’s forces.
The question is: what is the meaning of “rationality” according to Neumann? 
Indeed, if the rationality is only “instrumental”, it is overcome by the principle of 
self-preservation analysed by Horkheimer and Adorno. It is true that the Leviathan 
as state is a means for the purpose of self-preservation. However, in this case, the 
purpose is not self-preservation of the dominants, but those of all citizens; in addi-
tion, self-preservation does not lead to self-destruction like the version of the Hob-
besian civil society in Dialectic of Enlightenment.  The reason is not just subjective, 
it is also objective, as Horkheimer has underlined in Eclipse of Reason 42. Therefore, 
in Neumann’s thought, rationality is the main characteristic of Natural Law and 
underlies rational political systems:
39  According to Carl Schmitt, Hobbes is a philosopher of the dictatorship and is the theoretician of Deci-
sionism. In that way, we can link National Socialism and Hobbes together because, in Schmitt’s juristic 
theory, the Führer have the power to decide who the enemy is in order to protect the total state. Cf. Die 
Diktatur (1921), On the Concept of the Political (1932), and On the Three Types of Juristic Thought (1934). 
Yet in The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes (1938), he finds in Hobbes’s political theory seeds 
of liberalism.
40  Neumann F., Behemoth – The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, op. cit., p. 459.
41  Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan, chapter XXI, op. cit..
42  Cf. Horkheimer M. Eclipse of Reason, chapter 1 “Means and Ends”, op. cit., pp. 1-39.
354 —
“If every doctrine of Natural Law is based upon men as an individual, either autonomous 
or subject to the lawfulness of external nature, then man must be considered as a rational 
individual. That in turn implies the recognition of the essential equality of human beings. 
And this again lead to the universality of the Natural Law doctrine which is the central view 
common to all doctrines.” 43
Thus, Natural Law is universal and implies the recognition of equality because 
of the inborn rationality of human beings. Natural Law cannot be compatible with 
irrational doctrines or practises. The rationality of Natural Law derives from the 
rationality of human beings and produces a rational political system where hu-
man rights are applied. According to Neumann, even Hobbes’ absolutist doctrine 
of Natural Law is rational because it “base[s] the authority upon the consent of 
man” 44. In addition, in the essay “Der Funktionswandel des Rechtsgesetzes”, pub-
lished in the “Zeitschrift“ in 1937, Neumann shows that, in Hobbes political theo-
ry, the state and its laws are based upon Natural Law:
“Obwohl nach Hobbes Gesetz reine voluntas ist, obwohl Recht und Massnahmen des 
Souveräns jeder Art identisch sind, obwohl ein Recht ausserhalb des Staates nicht bestehen 
soll, nimmt er doch starke Einschränkungen an seiner monistischen Theorie dadurch vor, 
dass der Staat (und damit das Recht) selbst auf ein Naturgesetz basiert wird, dieses aber nicht 
nur voluntas, sondern auch ratio ist, da es die Erhaltung und Verteidigung des menschlichen 
Lebens zum Inhalt hat.“ 45
Consequently, Hobbes’s juridical doctrine is not a pure decisionism:  the sover-
eign makes law, but he must himself base this on the Natural Law when he makes 
it. Neumann contradicts thus Carl Schmitt’s vision of Hobbes. According to Carl 
Schmitt, Hobbes is indeed the first thinker of Decisionism 46. However, by his op-
position to the Nazi jurist, Neumann assert the rationality inherent in Hobbesian 
Commonwealth.
The other issue is that the rationality of the laws of nature would be only ideo-
logical, a means to enslave the people and justify all the actions of the sovereign. 
Neumann himself recognizes this ideological dimension of every doctrines of 
43  Neumann F., “Types of Natural Law” in ZfS, Jahrgang 8, 1939-49, München, Deutschen Taschenbuch Verlag, 
1980, p. 349.
44  Ibid, p. 357.
45  Neumann F., “Die Funktionswandel des Rechtsgesetzes”, in ZfS, Jahrgang 6, 1937, München, Deutschen Tas-
chenbuch Verlag, 1980, p. 544.
46  Cf. Schmitt C., Die Diktatur – Von der Anfängen des modernen Souveränitätsgedankens bis zum proletarischen 
Klassenkampf, Berlin, Duncker und Humblot, 2015, the first chapter „Die kommissarische Diktatur und die 
rechtstaatliche Theorie“, p. 1-25. / Schmitt C., On the Three Types of Juristic Thought, Joseph W. Bendersky 
trans., Praeger Publishers, 2004.
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Natural Law. For example, thomistic Natural Law is “a kind of codification of the 
feudal order, a completely authoritarian order” 47. However, it is just “one aspect of 
the system” 48: thomistic doctrine is progressive insofar as it is in opposition with 
the Augustinism and the royal domination by “charisma”. Furthermore, Hobbes’ 
doctrine of Natural Law is not ideological for him. It seems that he is more revo-
lutionary than previously considered:
“The democratic kernel and the inherent revolutionary dynamics were clearly perceived 
by the Court and rejected by the ruling classes, who were afraid and ashamed of that outs-
poken philosopher whose materialism allowed no veiling ideology.” 49 
According to Hobbes, the laws of nature are rational, not only because they are 
rules of prudence in order to reach the peace, but also because they imply obedi-
ence with consciousness. They are certainly an expression of the ideological power 
of the sovereign, but it is not clear whether the concept of “ideology” is, only a 
doctrine serves and hides the interests of the dominants here. They are ideological 
because they represent an education of the citizens, which require their rationality 
as consciousness and understanding 50. 
It seems that Neumann understands the concept of “rationality” as universal and 
not as instrumental. The result of this understanding is that the citizen’s obedience 
is not only influenced by terror, but also by their “consent”. However, it does not 
mean that the sovereign will lose his rights to rule people if he does not “fulfil his 
side of the bargain”, as Neumann claims it in his Behemoth:
“The whole power of the sovereign is, for Hobbes, merely a part of a bargain in which the 
sovereign has to fulfil his obligations, that is, preserve order and security so that there may be 
realized ‘the liberty to buy and sell and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their 
own adobe, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as they them-
selves think fit’. If the sovereign cannot fulfil his side of the bargain, he forfeits his sovereign-
ty. Such a theory has little common with National Socialism, absolutistic as it may be.” 51
First, Hobbes asserts that there is not a covenant between citizens and the sover-
eign. The covenant is made only between citizens: they commit, one to each other, 
47  Neumann F., “Types of Natural Law” in ZfS, Jahrgang 8, 1939-40, p. 351.
48  Ibid, p. 352.
49  Ibid, p. 356.
50  On the ideological function of the sovereign in Hobbes’ philosophy, cf. Leviathan, op. cit., chapter XXX.
51  Neumann F., Behemoth – The structure and Practice of National Socialism, op. cit. p. 459.
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to lay down the unlimited right of nature and to obey the beneficiary of the trans-
fer, that is, the future sovereign. The sovereign is not obliged towards his subjects 
by a “bargain”. Moreover, he cannot “forfeit his sovereignty”, because the rights of 
the sovereign are inalienable 52. Nevertheless, it is true that he has not betray them, 
because he is the beneficiary of a “gift”. Thus, he has to respect the fourth law of 
nature about the “grace” or the “free gift”: “that a man which received benefit from 
another of mere grace endeavour that he which giveth it, have no reasonable cause 
to repent him of his good will” 53. So, Hobbes’s theory “has little in common with 
National Socialism” 54, not because Hobbesian sovereign has to “fulfil his side of 
bargain”, but because of the trust of the people in him and his obligation to fulfil 
the “safety of the people”, that is, the respect of Natural Law.
To conclude, I would like to add that the way to conceive human nature de-
termines how one defines the state. On the one hand, if human reason is just 
instrumental, the state is only an ensemble of techniques to dominate people for 
the benefit of the dominant minority. In this case, the state cannot be democratic 
and is always potentially fascist. On the other hand, if human beings are capable of 
rationality in an objective and universal meaning, it is possible to conceive a “real 
state”, which can serve the people if it is well structured. In my opinion, Neumann 
is right when he underlines the importance of political theory for the viability of 
a political structure. Indeed, National Socialism is a non-state because it has no 
political theory. So, when we follow the way of Horkheimer and Adorno without 
completing their fruitful thought with a political theory, the risk is to miss the 
possibilities of emancipation that we can find in the political sphere and through 
the structures of the state.
52  Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan, chapter XVIII, § 4, whose title is “Sovereign power cannot be forfeited”, op. cit..
53  Hobbes, Leviathan, op. cit., p. 100.
54  Neumann F., Behemoth – The structure and Practice of National Socialism, op. cit. p. 459.
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